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HOME SWEET HOME?: WHAT MASSACHUSETTS CAN TELL US
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ILLINOIS AFFORDABLE
HOUSING PLANNING AND APPEAL ACT
CHRISTIAN B. HENNION*
INTRODUCTION
In August 2004, forty-nine communities in Illinois received notice that
they would each be required to prepare a plan to create additional afford-
able housing units in their community.1 These plans were the first step in
implementing the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act
(the "Illinois Act"),2 a relatively new Illinois law designed to "encourage
counties and municipalities to incorporate affordable housing within their
housing stock sufficient to meet the needs of their county or community." 3
However, even at this early stage in its implementation, this statute is gen-
erating debate regarding both its legal effect and its practicality as a reme-
dial measure. 4 These questions and others will likely continue to emerge as
the Illinois Housing Development Authority ("IHDA") and State Housing
Appeals Board ("SHAB") move forward with enforcement.
Some of these questions may be answered, however, by referring to
lessons learned far from the suburbs of Chicago. In Massachusetts, statutes
substantially similar to the Illinois Act have been in effect since 1969. 5 As
such, courts in that state have had over three decades to consider the reach
and effect of those laws, and scholars and practitioners have had ample
opportunity to analyze their effectiveness in creating more affordable hous-
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006; B.A., University of Oklahoma, 2002.
1. Courtney Flynn & Susan Kuczka, 49 Towns Must Add Affordable Housing, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
12, 2004, § 2 (Chicago ed.), at 1.
2. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/1-67/50 (West Supp. 2005).
3. Id. § 67/10.
4. See Flynn & Kuczka, supra note I (discussing applicability of the Act to home rule communi-
ties and quoting officials who doubt the law can be implemented in their communities effectively).
5. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 2004).
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ing.6 By referring to the Massachusetts experience, the parties affected by
the Illinois Act can begin to predict the future of that legislation.
This Note will examine both the Illinois Act and its Massachusetts
counterpart and will discuss how the lessons learned in Massachusetts, both
inside and outside of the courtroom, can shed some light upon the future of
the Illinois Act and suggest ways to enhance its effectiveness. 7 This analy-
sis reveals that while direct legal challenges likely will be unsuccessful in
striking down the Illinois Act in its entirety, the Illinois Act's inherent
weaknesses and the practical challenges that it faces likely will limit its
effectiveness as currently written. Part I will briefly sketch the issue of
affordable housing and exclusionary zoning in the United States. Part II
will lay out the legal framework of the Illinois Act and compare it to that in
place in Massachusetts, noting both the similarities and the differences
between them. Part III will address some of the legal challenges brought
against the Massachusetts law, assess the likelihood of similar challenges in
Illinois, and predict the likely outcome of such challenges. Part IV will
discuss the various practical and implementation difficulties that arguably
have muted the effectiveness of the Massachusetts law and will attempt to
determine if those same difficulties will affect the Illinois Act. Finally, Part
V will provide some recommendations for making the Illinois Act more
effective.
I. THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING DILEMMA
The United States lacks sufficient affordable housing units to satisfy
the needs of its citizens. In 1999, almost 28 million American households
reported spending more than thirty percent of their income on housing,
which is the threshold of "affordability" established by the federal govern-
ment.8 According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard Uni-
versity, of the over 21 million American households within the lowest
6. See, e.g., Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Compre-
hensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Legislative Effort to
Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381, 388-89 (2001).
7. While Massachusetts has the oldest of the statewide appeal statutes, and thus provides the
most extensive grounds for comparison at present, several other states in the northeastern U.S. have
enacted similar statutes. For a description of these states' efforts, see generally Sam Stonefield, Afford-
able Housing in Suburbia: The Importance but Limited Power and Effectiveness of the State Override
Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 323 (2001) (discussing state override laws in Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island).
8. MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N, MEETING OUR NATION'S HOUSING CHALLENGES 2 (2002),
http://www.mhc.gov/MHCReport.pdf.
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income quintile in 2003, over 15 million fell within this affordability gap. 9
In 1999, shortages in affordable rental units forced 1.7 million low-income
American households into "severely inadequate housing, placing their
health and safety at risk."'10 In its 2002 report, the bipartisan Millennial
Housing Commission suggested that the situation was not improving for
Americans in need of affordable housing, noting that the number of units
considered affordable to low- and moderate-income renters fell by over
nine percent between 1985 and 1999.11 The Commission also concluded
that federal measures had proven inadequate, standing alone, to ease the
growing affordable housing shortage. 12
Federal housing programs have changed significantly since their birth
in the 1930's. 13 Today, several federal programs grant assistance to provid-
ers of affordable housing. 14 The HOME program provides block grants to
state and local governments for use in expanding the stock of affordable
units. 15 Private developers can receive tax incentives from the federal gov-
ernment through the Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC") pro-
gram.16 This program provides a ten-year tax incentive to developers who
agree to maintain the development as affordable housing for at least thirty
years. 17 In addition, the federal government maintains mortgage insurance
programs that insure loans by private lenders for the construction or sub-
stantial rehabilitation of multifamily dwellings.' 8
However, these programs have not been successful in closing the af-
fordability gap. Some of the difficulty may arise from insufficient funding:
expenditures on federal housing assistance have accounted for an ever-
diminishing proportion of total tax expenditures over much of the last quar-
9. JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING
2005 39 tbl.A-I 1 (2005), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2005/son2005.pdf. The
report also points out that even these sobering figures fail to account for households who live in over-
crowded or "structurally inadequate" housing falling within the technical definition of affordability. Id.
at 3.
10. MILLENNIAL HouS. COMM'N, supra note 8, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 22-24.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 118. The developer must either (1) maintain twenty percent of the units as "affordable"
(gross rents not exceeding thirty percent of monthly income) to tenants earning less than fifty percent of
the area median income, or (2) maintain forty percent of the units as affordable to tenants earning less
than sixty percent of the area median income. Id.
18. Id. at 107, 115. These programs are not explicitly limited by tenant income in the same way as
the LIHTC program.
2006]
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ter-century.19 Further still, many federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") mortgages are reaching maturity, meaning that a
significant proportion of units that are currently affordable may no longer
be affordable in ten years' time.20
As serious as these federal problems are, obstacles erected at the local
level often pose an even more formidable threat to affordable housing con-
struction. One municipal policy in particular, a group of zoning practices
collectively referred to as "exclusionary zoning," often raises substantial
obstacles to such construction. 21 Exclusionary zoning refers to municipal
zoning restrictions that operate to exclude low-income families by raising
the price of the general housing stock and decreasing the development of
affordable housing.22 These restrictions may prescribe minimum lot size,
setback, and floor space requirements. 23 They may instead establish a pat-
tern of underzoning for traditionally affordable types of housing, such as
multi-family dwellings and mobile homes, or of overzoning for non-
residential uses.24
One of the most well-known cases involving exclusionary zoning,
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, pro-
vides numerous examples of exclusionary zoning in practice.25 The mu-
nicipal practices in that case included lot size and floor space
requirements26 and development limitations on apartment units with multi-
ple bedrooms. 27 In one planned development, the township demanded that
the developer agree to pay educational expenses for children attending the
township's schools if "more than .3 school children per multi-family unit"
in the development attended school there.28 In another instance, the town-
ship "approved" a proposed subsidized development, but required the de-
velopment to adhere to the existing ordinances. 29 This meant that the
development would have to consist of "single-family detached dwellings
on 20,000 square foot lots," which effectively "killed realistic housing for
19. Id. at 24 fig.9.
20. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-20, MULTIFAMILY HOUSING: MORE ACCESSIBLE
HUD DATA COULD HELP EFFORTS TO PRESERVE HOUSING FOR LOW-INCOME TENANTS 3-5 (2004).
21. Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV.
1, 8-9 (2001).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
26. Id. at 719-20.
27. Id. at 721.
28. Id. at 721-22.
29. Id. at 722.
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this group of low and moderate income families."'30 While this is by no
means an exhaustive list of exclusionary zoning techniques, it is sufficient
to illustrate why federal assistance has not always succeeded in increasing
construction of affordable housing.
Recognizing that the affordability gap is often a local problem, some
states have enacted legislation to address the problem at the local level. The
solutions available to legislators are varied. 31 However, both Massachusetts
and Illinois have chosen a similar path, empowering a statewide appeals
board to review and override local zoning decisions that stand in the way of
affordable housing development under certain conditions. 32
II. STATEWIDE APPEAL ACTS: MASSACHUSETTS AND ILLINOIS
A. Massachusetts: Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act
The Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act
(the "Massachusetts Act") 33 provides that a "public agency or limited divi-
dend or nonprofit organization proposing to build low or moderate income
housing may submit to the board of [zoning] appeals.., a single applica-
tion to build such housing in lieu of separate applications to the applicable
local boards."'34 This provision streamlines the application process for af-
fordable housing developers by granting the local board of zoning appeals
the "same power to issue permits or approvals as any local board or official
who would otherwise act with respect to such application. '35 Thus, where a
developer might normally have to seek separate permits from numerous
local boards such as planning boards, historical commissions, or sewer
districts, the Massachusetts Act empowers the zoning board of appeals to
issue a single permit in their place.36 The local zoning board of appeals
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 972-74, 979-82 (2002) (describing inclusionary zoning
ordinances that require a certain proportion of all new development to be affordable, one alternative to
the method created under the Illinois Act).
32. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/30 (West Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B,
§ 22 (West 2004) (permitting developers to appeal from a denial or conditional approval of their build-
ing applications).
33. See Krefetz, supra note 6, at 381-82 (noting that Chapter 40B of Massachusetts General Laws
is commonly known as the "Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act").
34. Ch. 40B, § 21.
35. Id.
36. MASS. DEP'T OF Hous. & CMTY. DEV., OVERVIEW OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMPREHENSIVE
PERMIT LAW (2003), http://www.mass.gov/dhcdfroolKit/ch40Bg I.htm.
2006]
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may, after a public hearing, grant the requested "comprehensive permit" by
a majority vote and may attach conditions or other requirements to the
permit if it so chooses. 37 If the board votes to issue the permit, aggrieved
parties can appeal that decision to the courts. 38
However, if the board either denies the developer's application or
grants it "with such conditions and requirements as to make the building or
operation of [low or moderate income] housing uneconomic," the applicant
can appeal the board's decision to the Housing Appeals Committee
("HAC"), a body in the state's Department of Housing and Community
Development.39 If the local board denies the developer's application out-
right, the HAC review assesses only whether the decision of the local board
of appeals was "reasonable and consistent with local needs."'40 If the board
instead conditionally grants the application, the HAC determines whether
the conditions and requirements imposed "make the construction or opera-
tion of [the proposed] housing uneconomic and whether they are consistent
with local needs." 41 In either case, however, the controlling factor is
whether the board's decision was "consistent with local needs"; the Com-
mittee cannot vacate, modify, or remove board decisions or conditions that
are consistent with local needs, even if the board decisions make the pro-
posed development uneconomic.42
Therefore, the definition of "consistent with local needs" is one of the
most important aspects of the statute. The statutory definition begins by
stating that "requirements and regulations shall be considered consistent
with local needs if they are reasonable in view of the regional need for low
and moderate income housing... and if such requirements and regulations
are applied as equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized
housing. '43 While this definition is somewhat vague, the statute provides a
more explicit limitation upon the HAC's authority on review. Specifically,
if the city or town denying or conditionally granting the permit already has
low- or moderate-income housing "in excess of ten per cent of the housing
units reported in the latest federal decennial census of the city or town, or
on sites comprising one and one half per cent or more of the total land area
zoned for residential, commercial or industrial use," then the local board's
37. Ch. 40B, § 21.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 22.
40. Id. § 23.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 20.
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decisions are, by definition, consistent with local needs. 44 In this analysis,
housing units qualify as low- or moderate-income housing if they are sub-
sidized by the state or federal government. 45 In addition, a decision to deny
or conditionally grant the application is consistent with local needs if the
proposed development would result in new construction covering over
three-tenths of one percent of all zoned land or ten acres, whichever is lar-
ger, within one year.46 Thus, the statute provides a "safe harbor" from
Committee intervention for communities that fall within one of these statu-
tory categories.
B. Illinois: Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act
The Illinois Act begins by defining those local governments that are
exempt from its requirements, a determination that, although more compli-
cated in its formulation, is comparable in function to the Massachusetts
Act's safe harbor.47 First, any municipality with a population of less than
1,000 is exempt from the operation of the Illinois Act.48 Next, "any local
government in which at least 10% of its total year-round housing units are
affordable" is also exempt.49 Under the statute, a housing unit is affordable
if the cost of residing in that unit totals no more than thirty percent of the
gross annual household income for a household of the size that could oc-
cupy the unit,50 computed with reference to the area's median household
income.51 The IHDA must make this determination on an annual basis and
publish a list of exempt and non-exempt local governments. 52
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/20 (West Supp. 2005) (describing methods for determining
exempt local governments).
48. Id. § 67/15.
49. Id. It is interesting to note that the Illinois Act uses the same ten percent figure as the Massa-
chusetts Act, though that figure is never explained as having any independent significance.
50. Id. In computing the thirty percent threshold, the statute distinguishes between sale and rental
units. A sale unit is affordable if the sum of "mortgage, amortization, taxes, insurance, and condomin-
ium or association fees, if any" is less than thirty percent of the household's gross income. Id. A rental
unit is affordable if the sum of rent and utilities is less than thirty percent of the household's gross
income. Id.
51. Id. § 67/20(b). The statute uses the median income figure for the county or primary metropoli-
tan statistical area ("PMSA") in which the local government is located. In making its calculations, the
IHDA totals the number of (a) sale units that are affordable to households with a gross income of less
than eighty percent of the local median, and (b) rental units that are affordable to households with a
gross income of less than sixty percent of the local median, dividing the sum of such units by the total
number of local year-round housing units to derive the percentage of affordable units. Id.
52. Id. § 67/20(c).
2006]
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Non-exempt governments must adopt an affordable housing plan and
submit it to the IHDA; the first group of plans must have been approved by
the local authority before April 1, 2005. 53 The affordable housing plan
must include the following: (1) a statement of the number of affordable
units needed to exempt the local government from the Illinois Act, (2) an
identification of the most suitable property for developing affordable hous-
ing units, (3) incentives that the local government may provide to attract
affordable housing, and (4) an affordable housing goal selected from the
three available under the statute.54 The three approved goals are the follow-
ing: (i) affordable housing constitutes at least fifteen percent of new devel-
opment or redevelopment within the local government, (2) the number of
affordable housing units increases by at least three percentage points, or (3)
affordable housing units constitute at least ten percent of total year-round
housing units. 55
When the statute becomes fully effective, 56 an affordable housing de-
veloper can seek review by the State Housing Appeals Board ("SHAB") if
the developer's application to the local authority is "either denied or ap-
proved with conditions that in his or her judgment render the provision of
affordable housing infeasible." 57 When a qualifying developer files an ap-
peal with the SHAB, the SHAB will conduct a de novo review to determine
whether the local government placed an "undue burden" on the develop-
ment because it contained affordable housing. 58 In this proceeding, the
developer bears the burden of demonstrating that the application was un-
fairly denied or that unreasonable conditions were placed upon the pro-
posed affordable housing development. 59
While the initial ten percent threshold exempts some local govern-
ments, the Illinois Act contains a second set of safe harbor provisions that
53. Id. § 67/25.
54. Id. § 67/25(b).
55. Id. § 67/25(b)(iv).
56. See id. § 67/30. Section 30, which governs appeals to the State Housing Appeals Board,
becomes effective in two stages. Beginning in January 2006, affordable housing developers whose
applications are denied or granted with conditions that would render provision of affordable housing
infeasible may submit information to the Board, unless the local government is exempt from the Illinois
Act. The Board will provide this information in an annual report. Then, beginning in January 2009, the
Board will have the enforcement powers discussed below.
57. Id. § 67/30(b). To qualify as an affordable housing developer, the developer's proposed devel-
opment must be either subsidized by the federal or state government or subject to restrictions that keep
at least twenty percent of the units affordable for fifteen years (for sale units) or thirty years (for rental
units). Id. § 67/15.
58. Id. § 67/30(c).
59. Id.
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further limit the SHAB's authority. 60 First, the SHAB must dismiss the
developer's appeal if the local government has adopted, submitted, and
implemented its required affordable housing plan and has satisfied its cho-
sen affordable housing goal.61 Also, the SHAB must dismiss the appeal if
the local government's reason for denying the application was a "non-
appealable local government requirement, '62 defined as "all essential re-
quirements that protect the public health and safety, including any local
building, electrical, fire, or plumbing code requirements or those require-
ments that are critical to the protection or preservation of the environ-
ment." 63
If none of the safe harbor provisions apply, and the SHAB fmds in fa-
vor of the developer, then the SHAB "may affirm, reverse, or modify the
conditions of, or add conditions to, a decision made by the approving au-
thority. '64 The SHAB decision "constitutes an order directed to the approv-
ing authority and is binding on the local government. ' 65 The decision is
subject to judicial review, however, with the state appellate courts having
exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to SHAB decisions. 66
III. LEGAL QUESTIONS
In the years since its adoption, litigants have challenged the Massa-
chusetts Act on several grounds, but Massachusetts courts have not invali-
dated the law. 67 Likewise, challenges to the Illinois Act are likely
forthcoming. While these challenges are also unlikely to result in the
wholesale demise of the Illinois Act, an analysis of the likely challenges
reveals that the Illinois Act is vulnerable to partial invalidation and that it
likely requires additional clarification to be effective.
60. Under the Illinois Act, the IHDA determines exempt municipalities on an annual basis using
the ten percent standard. Id. § 67/20. The additional goal-based exemptions shield qualifying communi-
ties after the developer appeals to the SHAB, id. § 67/30(d), but do not technically render the munici-
pality "exempt" from the Illinois Act. See id. § 67/15 (defining "exempt local government" as "any
local government in which at least 10% of its total year-round housing units are affordable... or any
municipality under 1,000 population," without reference to any of the other, goal-based exemptions).
61. Id. § 67/30(d). The Illinois Act does not expressly establish any penalties for failing to submit
an affordable housing plan. Id. § 67/25. However, failing to submit a plan would prevent the failing
municipality from taking advantage of this statutory safe harbor provision.
62. Id. § 67/30(e).
63. Id. § 67/15.
64. Id. § 67/30(f).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 67/30(g).
67. See, e.g., Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393,424 (Mass. 1973).
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In discussing these challenges, it is important to bear in mind that ex-
clusionary zoning and opposition to affordable housing legislation need not
arise from motives that are classist or racist. While it would be naive to
suppose that these motivations are absent, there are many reasons for local
opposition to statutes like the Illinois Act. Exclusionary zoning can ad-
vance valuable community goals, many of which are echoed in the expla-
nations given by opponents of the Illinois Act.68 Some local officials and
residents who oppose the Illinois Act rely upon purely legal arguments,
claiming that the statute is inapplicable to their communities 69 or that it
represents an improper usurpation of municipal autonomy.70 Others simply
doubt that the statute is workable, claiming that their communities are
"built out" or that developers are unlikely to build affordable housing there
because of high land prices. 71 Opponents commonly make economic argu-
ments as well, emphasizing the possible adverse effects of affordable hous-
ing development on property values and the tax base in their
communities. 72 Finally, some opponents argue that affordable housing
developments will inevitably clash with existing development and thereby
compromise the character of the community.73
A. Applicability to Home Rule Communities
One potential legal challenge to the Illinois Act that is already a topic
of discussion among local officials and analysts is a claim that its provi-
sions do not apply to home rule communities. 74 In Illinois, municipalities
with populations of greater than 25,000, as well as other municipalities that
so elect, are designated home rule units. 75 "[A] home rule unit may exer-
cise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and
affairs," except as limited by the Illinois constitution or preempting stat-
68. See Span, supra note 21, at 9-15 (discussing the positive aspects of exclusionary zoning and
suggesting that it advances many of the same goals that zoning was originally created to address).
69. Flynn & Kuczka, supra note 1.
70. Trine Tsouderos, North Shore Dwellers Target Housing Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2004, § 2
(Chicagoland ed.), at 1. See also Span, supra note 21, at 12-13 (noting that for many communities,
"self-determination" in zoning matters "is a valuable end in itself').
71. Flynn & Kuczka, supra note 1.
72. Tsouderos, supra note 70. See also Span, supra note 21, at 10, 12-13 (noting community
concerns regarding decreases in property values and discussing taxation and service provision problems
that may arise when communities become less economically homogeneous).
73. Tsouderos, supra note 70. See also Span, supra note 21, at 11 (discussing community con-
cerns regarding "the character of the town as a whole").
74. Ronald S. Cope, The Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act: The New Illinois Affirma-
tive Action Housing Program, ILL. MUN. REv., June 2004, at 13, 15 (part 1).
75. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
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utes. 76 This home rule authority encompasses the ubiquitous police
power--"the power to regulate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare" 77-which, in turn, includes the power to enact
zoning restrictions. 78
Massachusetts also has a home rule provision in its state constitu-
tion,79 and Massachusetts courts have also held that this provision provides
municipalities with a "broad grant of powers to adopt ordinances or by-
laws for the protection of the public health, safety, and general welfare. 80
Likewise, this power includes the authority to enact zoning restrictions. 81
Thus, the relationship between the Massachusetts Act and the home rule
power is instructive in assessing whether and how the Illinois Act will af-
fect home rule communities in Illinois.
1. Massachusetts Law
Massachusetts courts have addressed the impact of the state's home
rule provision on the operation of its housing appeals law. In Board of Ap-
peals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee in the Department of
Community Affairs ("Hanover"), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts answered numerous questions regarding the Massachusetts Act, in-
cluding its applicability to home rule communities. 82 In deciding whether
the law applied to such communities, the court first considered whether the
Act vested the power to override local zoning regulations in the HAC. 83
Second, the court determined whether a power to override local zoning
regulations could be exercised consistently with the constitutional grant of
home rule authority to municipalities. 84
In response to the first question, the Hanover court held that the Mas-
sachusetts legislature intended to grant the power to override local zoning
regulations to the HAC. 85 The court reached this conclusion by considering
the extensive legislative history of the Massachusetts Act.86 Noting that the
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 N.E.2d 285, 292 (Il. App. Ct. 1981);
see also Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 606 N.E.2d 1154, 1163-64 (Ill. 1992) (discussing "a home rule
unit's concurrent power to regulate signs" by zoning restrictions).
79. MASS. CONST. amend, art. II.
80. Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 409 (Mass. 1973).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 401.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 406-07.
86. Id. at 402-06.
20061
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reports consulted by the legislature prior to enactment, as well as contem-
poraneous descriptions of the bill by the legislators themselves, pertained to
a need to overcome exclusionary zoning practices, the court concluded that
the legislature intended to provide relief from those practices through the
Massachusetts Act. 87 Then the court held that the interpretation of the stat-
ute must include the power to override local zoning ordinances to give
effect to the legislature's intent, even though the statute never expressly
used the word "zoning" in describing the override power.88
The court then considered the second question, holding that the Mas-
sachusetts legislature could confer the authority to override zoning regula-
tions without offending the constitutional grant of home rule authority to
local governments. 89 This required the court to answer two related ques-
tions. First, the court had to determine whether the state home rule amend-
ment protected the zoning power in the first instance. 90 Second, if the home
rule amendment did protect the zoning power, the court had to investigate
whether the legislature had acted in accordance with the state constitution
in limiting that power.91
The Massachusetts home rule amendment provides that a municipality
has the power to "exercise any power or function which the general court
[the state legislature] has power to confer upon it" through local ordinances
and by-laws. 92 Though broad, this power is not unlimited. First, a munici-
pality cannot "enact private or civil law governing civil relationships ex-
cept as an incident to an exercise of an independent municipal power. '93
Thus, to the extent that zoning ordinances govern civil relationships, they
are permissible under the Massachusetts home rule amendment only if they
do so as a mere incident to an independent municipal power.94
In a case prior to Hanover, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts interpreted the phrase "independent municipal power" to refer to "the
various component powers making up the broad police power." 95 Pursuant
to this interpretation, the Hanover court held that any effect that a town's
zoning regulations might have on civil relationships was merely "incidental
to the exercise of the town's independent police powers to control its land
87. Id. at 406.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Id. at 410.
90. Id. at 409.
91. Id.
92. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 11, § 6.
93. Id. § 7.
94. Id.
95. Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 260 N.E.2d 200,206-07 (Mass. 1970).
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usages in an orderly, efficient, and safe manner to promote the public wel-
fare."' 96 Thus, the Massachusetts home rule amendment protected the local
zoning power.97
However, this finding did not end the inquiry, as the court next had to
determine if the Massachusetts Act limited the home rule power to zone. A
home rule unit cannot legally exercise its home rule power in a manner
"inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in
conformity with powers reserved to the general court." 98 Therefore, the
court had to determine whether the legislature had enacted the Massachu-
setts Act, which limits the zoning power reserved to municipalities under
the home rule amendment, in accordance with the legislature's own re-
served powers. The legislature acts in accordance with the powers reserved
to it under the Massachusetts home rule amendment if it acts through "gen-
eral laws which apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and
towns, or to a class of not fewer than two." 99 Because the Massachusetts
Act is a general law that applied to multiple municipalities, the Hanover
court found that the legislature had acted in conformity with the home rule
amendment in enacting that law. 100 The court went on to conclude that
exclusionary municipal zoning practices would frustrate the purpose of the
Massachusetts Act, and were therefore inconsistent with that law.101 As a
result, exclusionary zoning practices were no longer afforded home rule
protection after the enactment of the Massachusetts Act.102
2. Illinois Law
If Illinois courts must determine whether the Illinois Act applies to
home rule municipalities, they will likely begin with the same two ques-
tions as the Hanover court. First, they must determine whether the legisla-
ture intended for the Illinois Act to confer the authority to override local
zoning regulations, which are a part of the local home rule authority. 103
This question marks the logical starting point for a judicial analysis of the
Illinois Act because if the courts answer this question negatively, they need
not consider the compatibility of the Illinois Act with the home rule author-
96. Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d at 409.
97. Id.
98. MASS. CONST. amend, art. II, § 6.
99. Id. § 8.
100. Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d at 409.
101. Id. at 409-10.
102. Id. at410.
103. Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 N.E.2d 285, 292 (I11. App. Ct. 1981).
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ity. If, however, state courts conclude that the Illinois Act does attempt to
confer such authority, they must then determine whether that grant is le-
gally effective, the second issue that the Hanover court addressed.
Like the Massachusetts Act, the text of the Illinois Act does not ex-
pressly state that it confers to the SHAB the power to override local zoning
ordinances. In the section entitled "Purpose," the legislature states that
frustrated affordable housing developers "may seek relief from local ordi-
nances and regulations that may inhibit the construction of affordable hous-
ing," but it does not explicitly use the term "zoning."' 104 Later, in the
section establishing the housing appeals process, the Illinois Act creates a
remedy for affordable housing developers whose building applications are
"denied or approved with conditions that in [the developers'] judgment
render the provision of affordable housing infeasible."' 05 To determine
whether the application was "unfairly denied or unreasonable conditions
have been placed upon [its] tentative approval," the SHAB shall "consider
any action taken by the unit of local government in regards to granting
waivers or variances" that impact "the economic viability of the develop-
ment." 106 Again, there is no express mention of "zoning."
Though the term "zoning" is never used, these provisions nonetheless
make it relatively clear that the legislature intended to confer the power to
override zoning ordinances to the SHAB under the Illinois Act. The Act
seeks to provide developers relief from restrictive "ordinances and regula-
tions" 107 by empowering the SHAB to "affirm, reverse, or modify the con-
ditions of, or add conditions to, a decision made by the [local] approving
authority."' 08 It is difficult to conceive of local ordinances and regulations,
other than zoning ordinances, that would significantly impede construction
of affordable housing. Further, the only express limit to the SHAB's over-
ride authority, as it pertains to local regulations, prohibits override of local
decisions based upon "non-appealable local government require-
ment[s]."' 109 These non-appealable requirements include "all essential re-
quirements that protect the public health and safety, including any local
building, electrical, fire or plumbing code requirements or those require-
ments that are critical to the protection or preservation of the environ-
104. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/10 (West Supp. 2005).
105. Id. § 67/30(b).
106. Id. § 67/30(c).
107. Id. § 67/10.
108. Id. § 67/30(f).
109. Id. § 67/30(e).
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ment." 10 It is telling that general zoning regulations are not specifically
enumerated within this exempted class.11' Finally, requiring the SHAB to
consider any waivers or variances granted by the approving authority sug-
gests that those underlying regulations being waived or varied, presumably
zoning ordinances, are precisely the types of "ordinances and regulations"
that the Illinois Act seeks to address. In sum, the text of the Act, though it
does not refer to the power to override zoning regulations explicitly, likely
attempts to confer that authority to the SHAB in its general grant of power
to override local decisions.
However, Illinois courts will not infer legislative intent to limit home
rule powers; the legislature cannot limit home rule powers without explic-
itly stating its intent to do so in the statute.1 12 As noted above, Illinois rec-
ognizes zoning as a home rule power. 113 Thus, without an explicit
legislative statement that the Illinois Act limits the zoning power of home
rule communities, courts will not imply a legislative intent to do so. In
addition, legislative acts that seek to limit home rule powers are subject to
constitutional limitations. Under the Illinois constitution, the legislature
may deny or limit most home rule powers not exercised by the State 1 4 "by
a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each
house."1 5 Because the Illinois Act did not pass either chamber of the legis-
lature by a three-fifths margin, it likely cannot limit or deny a home rule
power like zoning. 116
Even though the Illinois Act likely does not place a blanket limitation
upon home rule zoning authority, it is still possible for a municipality to
110. Id.§67/15.
111. This exclusion may implicate the familiar rule of statutory construction that items excluded
from an enumerated list within a statute are not subject to that statute's provisions. See, e.g., Burke v.
12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 522, 527 (111. 1992). Even so, the ambiguities within the
definition of "non-appealable local government requirements" leave open the possibility of a broad
judicial reading that would encompass most zoning ordinances, as well as municipal attempts to cloak
exclusionary zoning practices within the protected classification. See infra Part IV.
112. See Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 606 N.E.2d 1154, 1164-65 (Ill. 1992) (holding that statute
must specifically refer to home rule communities in order to limit home rule powers).
113. See Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 N.E.2d 285, 292 (I11. App. Ct.
1981) (noting that zoning is a home rule power).
114. The legislature may deny or limit any home rule power other than the powers to make local
improvements by special assessment and to levy or impose additional taxes within their boundaries.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(l). In addition, the legislature may not provide for exclusive state exercise of
the power to tax. Id. § 6(h).
115. Id. § 6(g).
116. The version of Illinois Act enacted by the Illinois General Assembly passed the Senate by a
thirty-one to twenty-five vote with three not voting and the House by a sixty-one to fifty-two vote with
three present votes and two absent. H.B. 0625 Vote History, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2003),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/93/senate/09300HBO625-J52 1 2003- 0 10OT.pdf (Senate),
http://www.ilga.gov/Iegislation/votehistory/93/house/09300HBO625_05292003-048000C.pdf (House).
2006]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
overreach its home rule authority in particular cases. The home rule power
extends to those matters "pertaining to [local] government and affairs,"'117
and though this authority is broad, Illinois courts have articulated limits to
its reach. Under the "statewide concern" doctrine, a home rule unit may use
its power to regulate problems that are local in nature, but not those which
are statewide or national concerns. 118
Where a home rule municipality claims that it is exempt from a state
law, the court will examine three factors to determine whether the state-
wide concern limitation applies: (1) the extent to which the municipal con-
duct has an effect outside of the municipality, (2) the traditional allocation
of authority between the state and local government on the subject, and (3)
the relative interests of the state and local governments in regulating the
subject. 19 These factors favor municipal primacy in zoning decisions in
most cases, but Illinois courts have not always deferred to local applica-
tions of zoning ordinances and other land use regulations. For example,
courts have granted relief from local ordinances requiring special use per-
mits for a state prison facility, 120 a regional bus garage and maintenance
facility,121 and a sewage treatment plant. 122 These cases illustrate that home
rule zoning authority may be curtailed when it unduly hinders uses that
benefit government units beyond the home rule municipality.
Even so, drawing a parallel between these cases (which pertain to tra-
ditional service functions that have an extraterritorial impact) and privately-
developed affordable housing (which does not so obviously display either
characteristic) will likely prove difficult. In many ways, zoning housing
development is quintessentially local in character. Courts will likely resist
extending the statewide concern doctrine to something as pedestrian as
housing development, fearing such extension would effectively remove any
meaningful limiting principle from the doctrine and render home rule au-
thority largely illusory. 123
On the other hand, supporters of the Illinois Act will likely point to the
wealth of academic literature surrounding the extraterritorial impact of high
117. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
118. People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d 316, 321 (111. 1988).
119. Id.
120. City of Joliet v. Snyder, 741 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Il. App. Ct. 2000).
121. City of Evanston v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 559 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
122. Metro. Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 347 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Ill. 1976).
123. For a critical perspective on the "statewide concern" doctrine, including its detrimental effect
on the home rule power, see Arthur C. Thorpe & Janet N. Petsche, Will the "Statewide Concern"
Limitation Destroy Home Rule?, 80 ILL. B.J. 182 (1992).
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housing costs as support for application of the statewide concern rule. 124
The "spatial mismatch" hypothesis posits that there is a mismatch between
job opportunities, which have shifted in large numbers from central cities
to suburbs, and non-resident workers (largely conceived of as the urban
poor) who would take the jobs but who cannot because of various structural
barriers. 125 Some of these barriers, such as lengthy commutes and limited
mass transit between central cities and suburbs, could be alleviated if the
urban workforce relocated to their suburban jobsites. However, the lack of
affordable housing in these communities limits the ability of workers to
relocate. 126 The theory suggests that this unenviable calculus that faces the
urban workforce is responsible, at least in part, for central city unemploy-
ment and poverty. 127
When couched in these terms, exclusionary zoning has significant ef-
fects outside of the home rule municipality by maintaining a system of non-
resident, commuter workers in suburban areas and by contributing to the
poverty of the urban poor. 128 The relative state interest in regulating against
exclusionary zoning appears greater when cast in these terms, particularly
if the link between spatial mismatch and urban poverty is clearly estab-
lished because this link would draw state expenditures on aid to the urban
poor into the statewide concern analysis. In addition, the fact that afford-
able housing developments may benefit from state or federal subsidies 129
suggests that affordable housing may rise to the level of a statewide or
national concern. In light of the relative willingness of Illinois courts to
scrutinize municipal zoning ordinances, the Illinois Act may ultimately
124. See, e.g., John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decen-
tralization, 82 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1968) (discussing relationship between racially segregated housing, out-
migration of jobs from the central city, and urban poverty),
125. John Foster-Bey, Bridging Communities: Making the Link Between Regional Economies &
Local Community Development, STAN. L & POL'Y REV., Summer 1997, at 25,31.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Kain, supra note 124, at 196-97.
128. It is notable that all of the non-exempt communities under the Illinois Act lie either in Cook
County, where the City of Chicago is located, or in the five abutting collar counties. See Press Release,
Ill. Hous. Dev. Auth., Illinois Housing Development Authority Releases List of 49 Communities That
Must Comply with Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act (Aug. 12, 2004),
http://www.ihda.org/admin/IUpload/Files//8e3d4770-6932-4503-a3ad-665aOc32edcb.pdf (listing non-
exempt communities, all of which are situated in Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, or Will Coun-
ties); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK:
2000, app. C-22 (13th ed. 2001) (mapping locations of the pertinent counties).
129. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/15 (West Supp. 2005) (defining "affordable housing
development" to include "any housing that is subsidized by the federal or State government").
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apply to home rule municipalities in particular cases, notwithstanding its
failure to expressly preempt home rule authority.130
Regardless of whether or not this argument proves successful, the leg-
islature should specifically articulate its intent to grant the SHAB power to
override home rule zoning ordinances in a statute passed by a three-fifths
majority of both houses. As the Illinois Act now stands, it likely does not
apply to limit the zoning powers of home rule communities, and therefore
provides the SHAB with no meaningful authority over those communi-
ties. 131 Even so, the fact that the enforcement provisions of the Act do not
apply to home rule communities does not render the statute entirely ineffec-
tive. As currently enacted, the Illinois Act applies in its entirety to non-
home rule communities of over 1,000 inhabitants. 132
B. Right to Review
As the SHAB begins to enforce the Illinois Act, questions are likely to
arise regarding the right to seek judicial review of SHAB decisions and the
relationship of this right to pre-existing rights under the traditional zoning
appeals system. In the traditional system, a developer seeking a variation
applies to the local authority, 133 which must hold a public hearing with
statutory notice on the requested variation.134 If it is the local zoning board
of appeals that renders the final decision, judicial review is available under
the provisions of the Illinois Administrative Review Act. 135 This right to
130. See 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW: LAND
USE & THE POLICE POWER § 7.16 (2003 rev. ed.) (describing Illinois courts as showing "hostility
towards zoning," as compared to other states).
131. Those provisions of the Illinois Act that do not purport to curtail local authority are not subject
to the state constitutional limits noted above, and therefore they can likely be applied to home rule
communities. Thus, the SHAB may still maintain and disseminate information regarding denied devel-
opment applications in home rule communities. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/30(a) (West Supp.
2005). Likewise, the IHDA can include home rule communities within its annual list of non-exempt
communities (because home rule communities are not exempt within the meaning of the statute, see id.
§ 67/15) and can request an affordable housing plan from those communities (though it would serve no
purpose if the SHAB has no authority to override the local authority). Id. § 67/25. Whether this type of
enforcement is a responsible investment of state resources is open to debate.
132. See id. § 67/15 (providing that municipalities of under 1,000 population are exempt from the
Act).
133. The "local authority" in charge of zoning variations and special uses may be either the local
zoning board of appeals or the corporate authorities of the municipality, depending on the local ordi-
nance and size of the municipality. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-4,-5 (West 2005).
134. For municipalities, see id. § 5/11-13-6. For townships, see 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/110-
35 (West 1996). For counties, see 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-12009 (West 2005) (with some excep-
tions to the hearing requirements listed therein). The hearing is held before the local zoning board of
appeals.
135. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-13 (municipalities); 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/110-50
(townships); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-12012 (counties).
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review is "limited to parties of record to the proceeding before the adminis-
trative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties are affected by the deci-
sion," 136 which may include neighbors of the affected property. 137 On
review, the court will not disturb the local board's decision, to the extent
that it is based on findings of fact,138 unless that decision is "contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence."' 139 If the reviewing court reverses the
local board, the board lacks standing to appeal the decision upward, 140 but
if the court instead affirms the local board, the parties aggrieved by the
decision may appeal further. 141 Where, instead of the zoning board, the
municipal governing authority renders the final decision itself, aggrieved
parties can challenge that decision through an action for declaratory or
injunctive relief.142 Though the aggrieved parties will receive a de novo
hearing in such cases, they have the burden of showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the ordinance in question143 "is arbitrary and unrea-
sonable and bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety or
welfare" as applied to their case.144 Thus, under the current system,
whether the requested variation or special use is granted or denied, the
aggrieved parties may seek judicial review, though their evidentiary
threshold in seeking to overturn the local authority's decision is daunting.
136. Winston v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 95 N.E.2d 864, 868 (I11. 1950).
137. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-7. This provision, which governs notice in municipali-
ties of over 500,000 residents, provides that a neighboring owner (within 250 feet of the property at
issue) who appeared and objected at the board's hearing and demonstrated that its property would be
"substantially affected" by the outcome may seek review of the board's decision under the Administra-
tive Review Law. See also Podmajersky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 476 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (recognizing right to administrative review of abutting landowner). It is beyond the scope of this
discussion to enumerate all circumstances and locales that give abutting landowners or other aggrieved
parties a right to review-it is only important to note that some landowners do have such a right.
138. See Scadron v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 637 N.E.2d 710, 712-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (applying
deferential factual review standard to local board's decision not to grant a special use). However, if the
local board's decision rests upon a question of law, such as construction of the zoning ordinance, the
court will review de novo. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Vill. of Inverness, 735 N.E.2d 686, 688-89 (111.
App. Ct. 2000).
139. Scadron, 637 N.E.2d at 713.
140. Speck v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 433 N.E.2d 685, 687-88 (Ill. 1982).
141. See Scadron, 637 N.E.2d at 713 (deciding appeal by applicant from lower court's affirming of
local board).
142. See Kleidon v. City of Hickory Hills, 458 N.E.2d 931, 935-36 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (discussing
action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by abutters aggrieved by a variation granted by the
city council).
143. In such cases, there will always be an ordinance at issue. If a developer is challenging the
municipality's decision, the developer will be challenging the application of the zoning ordinance. If, on
the other hand, an aggrieved landowner is challenging the municipality's decision to grant a variation,
the ordinance at issue will be the variation itself See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-5 (West 2005)
("If the power to determine and approve variations is reserved to the corporate authorities, it shall be
exercised only by the adoption of ordinances.").
144. Kleidon, 458 N.E.2d at 940.
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Under the new statewide appeals system created by the Illinois Act, if
the local authority denies or conditionally approves a variation request, a
qualifying developer may appeal that decision to the SHAB rather than
directly to the courts. 145 Before the SHAB, the developer has the burden of
showing that the application was "unfairly denied" or that "unreasonable
conditions have been placed upon [its] tentative approval."'1 46 Review by
the SHAB is de novo, without regard to whether the decision below was
issued by a local board or by a municipal governing authority. 14 7 Once the
SHAB has rendered its decision, the state appellate courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over any further appeals.148
Two obvious questions arise from this appeals structure. First, which
parties to the local board's proceedings, other than the developer, 149 have
standing to appear before the SHAB or are entitled to notice of its proceed-
ings? Second, who has standing to appeal from SHAB decisions, and what
is the standard of review in the appellate courts on such appeal? Once
again, the analysis of these questions by Massachusetts courts is instructive
in predicting how Illinois courts might answer them.
1. Standing Issues
The Massachusetts Act is unambiguous on standing issues. If the local
board approves a developer's comprehensive permit application, parties
"aggrieved by the issuance" of that permit, including abutting landowners,
are entitled to judicial review under the same conditions as other zoning
decisions. 150 If the local board instead denies the application, then the ap-
plicant has the right to appeal to the HAC.151 In the HAC proceedings, too,
aggrieved parties such as abutters may intervene unless their interests are
"substantially similar" to those of a party already involved in the proceed-
ings and the would-be intervenors fail to show that their interests will not
be diligently represented by the parties already before the HAC. 152 Finally,
judicial review of HAC decisions is governed by chapter thirty A of the
145. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/30(b) (West Supp. 2005).
146. Id. § 67/30(c).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 67/30(g).
149. See id. § 67/30(f) (defining the SHAB's decision as "an order directed to the approving au-
thority"). This suggests that the approving authority has a direct stake in the outcome of the proceedings
and might properly be a named party in such proceedings.
150. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (West 2004) (defining the right to appeal by cross-
reference to chapter 40A, which governs ordinary zoning appeals).
151. Id. § 22.
152. 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 30.04(2) (2005), available at
http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/regulations/760030.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
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General Laws of Massachusetts, 153 which also extends to all parties "ag-
grieved" by the final decision. 154 Thus, at all levels in the process, it is
clear that aggrieved parties, such as abutters, have a right to present their
interests to the deciding body.
The language of the Illinois Act does not specify these matters as
clearly as its Massachusetts counterpart. However, Illinois law provides
that if a statute does not set out procedures for administrative proceedings,
the administrative proceedings will be "governed by established rules of
procedure applicable generally to administrative tribunals."'155 Thus, while
future regulations will define the nature of SHAB review, 156 courts could
rely on existing administrative structures to define the applicable proce-
dures, if necessary.
Specifically, questions regarding notice and hearings could be an-
swered by reference to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. 157 The
Administrative Procedure Act requires a hearing and notice to all parties in
contested cases, 158 defining "party" as "each person or agency named or
admitted as a party or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admit-
ted as a party."'159 Under this definition, the developer and the approving
authority would likely be the named parties in a proceeding before the
SHAB, and are therefore entitled to notice of its proceedings. What is un-
clear, however, is whether abutters or others aggrieved by the proposed
variation fall within this definition, because the Illinois Act does not state
whether such individuals are "entitled as of right" to intervene before the
SHAB. 160
One answer would be to allow abutters to participate as parties before
the SHAB to the same extent as they could before the local authority. This
solution recognizes that the SHAB decision effectively replaces the local
board decision, and thus treats it similarly to that decision. Under this ap-
proach, the question of notice can be answered with reference to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which would require notice to all parties who
153. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 22 (West 2004).
154. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 2001).
155. Flick v. Gately, 65 N.E.2d 137, 139 (IIl. App. Ct. 1946).
156. Under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, agencies must adopt procedures for hearings
on contested cases. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/10-5 (West 2005).
157. Id. § 100/10-25.
158. Id.
159. See id. § 100/1-55.
160. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/30 (West Supp. 2005) (making no mention of proper
parties before the SHAB or right to intervene).
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are entitled to participate in the SHAB proceeding. 161 One potential defini-
tion for eligible abutters already lies within the municipal code, which uses
a 250-foot radius for local hearings in large municipalities. 162 Allowing
these parties to intervene before the SHAB would be similar to the Massa-
chusetts approach.' 63
A second answer would be to exclude these other interested parties
from the SHAB process, or to limit their participation to situations where
the parties before the SHAB will not adequately represent their interests.
However, this approach would likely cut off abutters from any further right
to appeal the SHAB's decision. 164 This could result in a situation where
abutters "succeed" before the local board through denial of a variation re-
quest, only to have that success reversed by a proceeding before the SHAB
in which they could not participate and from which they cannot appeal.
While it is not completely certain that this would run afoul of the abutters'
rights, Illinois courts have recently shown some willingness to expand the
procedural rights afforded to such parties in administrative proceedings. 165
At a minimum, it seems unlikely that a court, when asked to review the
validity of the Illinois Act in its present form, would presume the absence
of procedures or protections necessary to render the Act constitutional. 166
Thus, a challenge to the Illinois Act on these grounds should not succeed,
at least at present.
2. Standard of Review
Massachusetts courts have also considered the standard of review that
the HAC should apply to the matters before it. The Massachusetts Act
came under fire on equal protection grounds for allegedly applying differ-
161. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/1-55.
162. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-7 (West 2005) (requiring written notice to record owners
of property within 250 feet of the proposed variation in municipalities of over 500,000 residents).
163. See 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 30.04(2) (2005), available at
http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/regulations/760030.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005) (establishing rights of
parties seeking to intervene before the HAG).
164. If appeals from the SHAB are ultimately governed by the Administrative Review Law, as
seems likely, the class of appellants is limited to parties of record in the administrative proceeding being
reviewed. Winston v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 95 N.E.2d 864, 868 (I11. 1950). Thus, an attempt by the
SHAB to grant a right of appeal to non-party abutters would likely prove unsuccessful.
165. See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 737 N.E.2d 1099, 1108-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000),
affd, 781 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. 2002). This case dealt with the right of neighbors to cross-examine witnesses
at a local land use hearing and found such a right in administrative proceedings. In affirming the Ap-
peals Court, the Illinois Supreme Court found that due process protected this right of the interested
neighbors. Klaeren, 781 N.E.2d at 234-36.
166. Cf Flick v. Gately, 65 N.E.2d 137, 139 (111. App. Ct. 1946) (noting that "established rules of
procedure" control administrative proceedings where standards are not provided).
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ent standards of review depending upon whether the initial application was
granted or denied.167 A local board challenged the statute by claiming that
the appeal to the HAC for denied permits was a limited review, while judi-
cial review of granted permits was de novo under Massachusetts law. 168
However, the court did not address the underlying constitutional argument
because it found that both HAC review of denied permits and judicial re-
view of granted permits was de novo. 169 Thus, the purported equal protec-
tion violation was nonexistent.
Illinois courts cannot follow the lead of Massachusetts on this point
because the Illinois Act specifies that the standards of review differ. It is
clear that the SHAB's review of denied or conditionally approved applica-
tions is de novo, 170 while both direct judicial review of a local zoning
board's decision 71 and direct judicial review of the corporate authority's
decision are deferential to the decision below. 172 Thus, if the local authority
denies a variation, a developer can proceed before the SHAB and obtain de
novo review, 173 and the SHAB decision is then likely subject to deferential
review on appeal. 174 On the other hand, if the local authority approves the
variation in the first instance, the SHAB never becomes involved, and those
aggrieved by the variation can either obtain limited judicial review under
the Administrative Review Act, in the case of a local board decision, 175 or
face long odds in a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief against the cor-
porate authority. 176
Litigants seeking to invalidate the Illinois Act on equal protection
grounds might make two arguments based on this distinction. First, they
might argue that developers are given unfair preference by the statewide
appeal mechanism, which effectively provides them with a second chance
at de novo review outside of the court system. Second, if potentially ag-
grieved parties cannot appeal the SHAB decision to the appellate court,
they might argue that similarly situated parties are being treated unequally
under the law based solely upon whether the local board denied the initial
167. Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 416 (Mass. 1973).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/30(b) (West Supp. 2005).
171. Scadron v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 637 N.E.2d 710, 712-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
172. Kleidon v. City of Hickory Hills, 458 N.E.2d 931, 940 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
173. § 67/30(b).
174. Scadron, 637 N.E.2d at 713 (setting out scope of review under the Administrative Review
Act). This assumes that SHAB decisions are ultimately made subject to review under the Administra-
tive Review Act, which is the manner in which local decisions are currently reviewed.
175. Id.
176. Kleidon, 458 N.E.2d at 940.
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application (which could trigger the SHAB review process) or approved it
(which would trigger the existing administrative review process). 177
The first argument likely lacks merit. The mere fact that the statute
treats developers differently from aggrieved parties does not necessarily
render the statute a violation of equal protection.178 The Illinois Supreme
Court noted long ago that the legislature "may ... give to a party belonging
to one class two hearings before his rights are determined and to one be-
longing to a different class one hearing, only," if the classifications are
"based on a rational difference." 179 Under the Illinois Act, which seeks to
encourage and enable increased development of affordable housing, the
legislature likely sought to provide some advantage to affordable housing
developers in gaining approval for their proposals. Whether justified in
terms of the general need for more affordable housing or in terms of a per-
ceived local bias against affordable housing, a reviewing court could al-
most certainly find a rational basis for treating developers differently under
the Illinois Act than other parties. 180
The second argument has more merit because it suggests that similarly
situated aggrieved parties, such as abutters, might be treated differently
based solely upon the initial denial or grant of the developer's application.
As a result, abutters who succeeded at the local level could effectively be
afforded fewer opportunities to defend their rights than those who failed at
the local level. 181 However, as was noted in the preceding section, it is
unlikely that a court, if asked to evaluate the Illinois Act at the current stage
in its development, would presume that abutters are barred from appealing
SHAB decisions if that right to appeal is necessary to uphold the Act. 182
177. This is a variant of the problem noted in the preceding section of this Note. An example can
clarify how this application is also problematic: In case one, the local board grants a developer's re-
quested variation. In this case, abutters (to the extent they have a right to appeal) could appeal upwards
through the judicial system, pursuant to the Administrative Review Act. In case two, the local board
denies the developer's requested variation. In this case, the developer can appeal to the SHAB, pursuant
to the Illinois Act. If the SHAB goes on to reverse the local board and grant the variation, abutters
would likely wish to appeal the SHAB decision to the courts. However, if the Illinois Act is interpreted
to deny these abutters the right to appeal SHAB decisions, then they are without recourse. Thus, the
abutters in case one are treated differently than the abutters in case two based solely upon whether the
local board denies or approves the developer's variation request. In fact, their right to further appeal is
extinguished in the case where they succeed at the local level and preserved in the case where theyfail.
178. See, e.g., Arvia v. Madigan, 809 N.E.2d 88, 99 (Il1. 2004) (noting that the government may
draw categorical distinctions between people under certain circumstances).
179. Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Inv. Co., 140 N.E. 49, 51 (111. 1923).
180. See Arvia, 809 N.E.2d at 99 (noting that court will uphold a non-"suspect" classification if it
can "reasonably conceive of any set of facts to justify the statutory classification").
181. See supra note 177.
182. Cf Flick v. Gately, 65 N.E.2d 137, 139 (I11. App. Ct. 1946) (noting that "established rules of
procedure" control administrative proceedings where standards are not provided).
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Therefore, this equal protection challenge to the Illinois Act should also
fail.
C. Vagueness
Another challenge that opponents could raise against the Illinois Act is
that it is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of due process guarantees. 183
The challenger claiming vagueness would almost certainly direct its claim
at the Act's provisions relating to the SHAB appeals process-particularly
the criteria to be used on SHAB review. These provisions state that the
SHAB determines on review whether a developer's application was "un-
fairly denied" or whether "unreasonable conditions [were] placed upon [its]
tentative approval."'184 In making its determination, the SHAB "shall con-
sider the facts and whether the developer was treated in a manner that
places an undue burden on the development due to the fact that the devel-
opment contains affordable housing."' 185 It must also consider the local
government's actions "in regards to granting waivers or variances" that
would impact the "economic viability of the development."'1 86 Finally, the
SHAB must dismiss an appeal if the reason for denial was a "non-
appealable local government requirement,"' 187 which encompasses "all
essential requirements that protect the public health and safety."1 88 If a due
process challenge arose, Illinois courts would have to determine whether
these provisions are unconstitutionally vague.
In the Hanover case, the Massachusetts court determined that the
standards set out in the Massachusetts Act were not unconstitutionally
vague. 189 The two challenged standards were, (1) "consistent with local
needs," and (2) "uneconomic." 190 However, as the court noted, both of
these terms were expressly defined within the statutory text. 191
183. See Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 412-14 (Mass. 1973) (address-
ing vagueness challenge to the Massachusetts Act).
184. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/30(c) (West Supp. 2005).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. § 67/15.
189. See Bld. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 412-14 (Mass. 1973). The
actual vagueness challenge leveled against the Massachusetts Act in this case was that the statute set out
no standards for the local board's decision to grant or deny requests for comprehensive permits. The
challenger argued that the standards set out in the Massachusetts Act only applied to HAC review. In its
opinion, the court first determined that the same standards set out for the HAC also applied to local
boards. The court then went on to determine that those standards were sufficiently definite to survive a
due process challenge.
190. Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 23 (West 2004). In Board of Appeals v. Housing
Appeals Committee, the court held that the word "reasonable" in section 23, referring to denied applica-
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Regarding the first standard, requirements and regulations are "consis-
tent with local needs" under the Massachusetts Act if "they are reasonable
in view of the regional need" for affordable housing and "applied as
equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing."' 192 The
reviewing body (the HAC or a reviewing court) assesses whether the regu-
lations are reasonable with regard to the number of "low income persons"
in the local area and the needs (1) to protect the "health or safety" of both
the occupants of affordable housing and the other residents in the area, (2)
"to promote better site and building design in relation to the surroundings,"
or (3) "to preserve open spaces."'193 In addition, regulations are consistent
with local needs if the local government falls within one of the safe harbors
previously noted in Part II A of this Note.194
With regard to the second standard, the Massachusetts Act defines a
development as "uneconomic" if it is "impossible" for (1) a public agency
or nonprofit organization to build or operate the proposed housing "without
financial loss," or (2) a limited dividend organization to build or operate the
housing "and still realize a reasonable return." 195 The court held that the
statutory floor created by the safe harbor provisions, combined with the
statutory definitions of their terms, set out a sufficiently definite balancing
test to survive the due process challenge. 196
The Illinois Act does not provide statutory definitions for "undue bur-
den," "unfairly denied," or "unreasonable conditions,"' 97 so Illinois courts
cannot rely upon express statutory definitions to reject a due process chal-
lenge to those provisions. Instead, a court will examine the language and
purpose of the statute to determine if the statute's terms are definite enough
to guide those who are bound by it.198 The purpose of the Illinois Act's
statewide appeal provision is to provide a developer with an opportunity for
review if it believes that the local board "unfairly" denied its proposal be-
tions ("reasonable and consistent with local needs"), was merely "surplus verbiage," and thus focused
its analysis solely on the terms "consistent with local needs" and "uneconomic." 294 N.E.2d at 413
n.17.
191. Seech. 40B § 20.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 412-14 (Mass. 1973).
197. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/15 (West Supp. 2005) (setting out definitions for the Act,
which do not include "unfairly denied" or "unreasonable conditions"). It is possible that administrators
may define these terms in accompanying regulations in the future.
198. E.g., Chastek v. Anderson, 416 N.E.2d 247, 249 (I11. 1981).
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cause the proposed development included affordable housing. 199 At the
same time, the SHAB has no authority to override "essential requirements"
protecting public health and safety or the environment.200 Finally, the stat-
ute places the burden of showing an undue burden upon the developer who
appeals to the SHAB. 201 Taken together, these provisions can be reasona-
bly construed as an effort to provide relief from local zoning practices that
discriminate against affordable housing without a sufficient public welfare
justification. By exempting essential requirements, the legislature evi-
denced its intent to balance the public purpose underlying local zoning
ordinances with the need to encourage development of affordable hous-
ing.202 Thus, a developer could prevail by showing that concerns less im-
portant to the public welfare than the need for affordable housing motivated
the board denial or conditional approval of the developer's application-
burdens imposed on such grounds would be "undue" in light of the short-
age of affordable housing.
Unlike the previous terms, the statute does provide a definition for
"non-appealable local government requirements, '203 defining them as "all
essential requirements that protect the public health and safety, including
any local building, electrical, fire, or plumbing code requirements or those
requirements that are critical to the protection or preservation of the envi-
ronment. '204 The reviewing body (the SHAB or the appellate courts) might
interpret this language to encompass all exercises of the local police power,
including all zoning regulations. 205 Conversely, the enumerated examples
that follow could provide context for interpreting the meaning of the clause
and limit the definition of these non-appealable requirements to something
less than the full range of the police power.206
Under the limited reading, the reference to requirements such as fire,
electrical, and building codes suggests that regulations essential to protect-
199. § 67/10.
200. Id. § 67/15.
201. Id. § 67/30(c).
202. Id. § 67/5 (finding that there is a shortage of quality affordable housing in Illinois and noting
the need to provide such housing for the workforce and retirees).
203. Id. § 67/15.
204. Id.
205. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (providing that home rule communities have the power to
"regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare"); Thompson v. Cook
County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 N.E.2d 285, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (noting that zoning is a home
rule power).
206. See, e.g., City of E. St. Louis v. E. St. Louis. Fin. Advisory Auth., 722 N.E.2d 1129, 1133-34
(Ill. 1999) (applying doctrine of ejusdem generis to derive the meaning of the phrase "all powers neces-
sary" in a statute granting "all powers necessary ... including, but not limited to" a list of enumerated
powers).
2006]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ing building occupants or the general public from physical harm must be
applied to all construction, affordable or not. More specifically, it suggests
that substandard construction is simply unacceptable, even in pursuit of the
statute's goals. However, it does not go so far as to embrace all exercises of
the police power-instead, it considers how directly related those exercises
are to protecting the public from harm. While the reference to requirements
"critical to the protection or preservation of the environment" is not ac-
companied by enumerated examples, the use of the word "critical" denotes
that these requirements must be vital to environmental protection pur-
poses.207 Thus, under the limited reading, relatively few applications of the
zoning power would be non-appealable.
In contrast, the broader construction of this passage would make any
legitimate use of the police power a non-appealable requirement, and
would thus limit the SHAB's power to those cases where the underlying
zoning practice exceeded the municipal police power. This reading would
make the developer's case much more difficult by shifting the analysis
from whether a particular requirement is "essential" to whether that re-
quirement is a permissible use of the police power. This reading is a plau-
sible interpretation of the passage, but it does not adhere as closely to
general principles of statutory construction as the limited reading in three
respects. First, it minimizes the effect of limiting language within the stat-
ute, such as the listing of safety codes or the use of words like "essential"
and "critical." Second, this reading appears to contradict the legislative
intent underlying the statute by allowing most zoning practices to elude
SHAB review. Finally, such a reading would give the statute an almost
empty meaning because developers can already directly challenge munici-
pal ordinances that exceed the police power in Illinois courts without the
assistance of the Illinois Act. 208
Even though there is room to debate the meaning of these passages, Il-
linois courts are unlikely to invalidate the Act for indefiniteness, given the
deferential standard applied to vagueness challenges. 209 Before the SHAB
207. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th
ed. 1997) (defining "critical" as "INDISPENSABLE, VITAL").
208. See, e.g., Kleidon v. City of Hickory Hills, 458 N.E.2d 931, 935-36 (111. App. Ct. 1983)
(allowing challenge to municipal ordinance which granted a zoning variation).
209. See generally Ardt v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 607 N.E.2d 1226, 1234-35 (Il1. 1992)
(finding a prohibition of "statements which contain false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading material
or guarantees of success, statements which play upon the vanity or fears of the public, or statements
which promote or produce unfair competition" in dental advertisements sufficiently definite to survive
challenge); Chastek v. Anderson, 416 N.E.2d 247, 249, 251 (111. 1981) (finding a provision that allowed
revocation of dental licenses for "improper, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" sufficiently defi-
nite to survive constitutional challenge).
[Vol 81:679
HOME SWEET HOME?
hears its first appeal, the IHDA will likely draft regulations that more
clearly define key provisions of the Illinois Act. If not, the SHAB members
will decide which meaning they will give to the non-appealable require-
ments language when they begin hearing appeals, and the appellate courts
will ultimately determine if that interpretation is legally sound. In sum,
though the Illinois Act is not without some ambiguity, it provides enough
detail that those charged with compliance can adapt their behavior to meet
its requirements; therefore, Illinois courts are unlikely to invalidate the Act
on vagueness grounds.210
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
Even though Illinois courts are unlikely to invalidate the Illinois Act in
its entirety, this does not guarantee that it will be successful in prompting
the development of affordable housing. Numerous practical challenges
stand in the way of the statute's ultimate goals. Some of these challenges
have already been fleshed out through the preceding discussion-most
notably, the Act's failure to expressly preempt home rule authority. Over
one-half of the population of Illinois resides in cities populous enough to
qualify as home rule communities by default, 2 11 and smaller municipalities
could elect to become home rule communities as well. 2 12 This places a
significant proportion of the state's population beyond the reach of the
statute, making its goals more difficult to achieve.
Another difficulty facing the statute follows necessarily from its se-
lected method of operation. The Illinois Act, like the Massachusetts Act, is
a "supply side" provision that relies upon forces in the housing market to
provide needed affordable housing. 2 13 The assistance that a supply side
statute like the Illinois Act provides to developers has been categorized as
"indirect, non-directive, and non-financial. '2 14 This is evident from a re-
view of the statutory mechanism. First, the statute is "indirect" because it
does not make the state itself responsible for building affordable housing,
but rather relies on private developers to meet the need. Next, the statute is
almost entirely "non-directive" because it places no positive obligations
210. See, e.g., Chastek, 416 N.E.2d at 249 (stating that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague "if
the duty imposed by the statute is prescribed in terms definite enough to serve as a guide to those who
must comply with it").
211. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2000 CENSUS POPULATION COMPARED
TO 1990: ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES, http://illinoisgis.ito.state.il.us/census2000/census-
Data/2000/docs/munipop.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2006).
212. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
213. Stonefield, supra note 7, at 333-35.
214. Id. at 344.
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upon the local government beyond submitting an affordable housing
plan; 215 all of the other provisions are reactive rather than proactive, trig-
gered only if a qualifying developer seeks to build affordable housing and
is either denied or conditionally granted that opportunity. 216 Finally, the
statute is decidedly non-financial because it neither provides new state
incentives for affordable housing development nor requires local govern-
ments to provide such incentives themselves, though local governments
might choose to do so as part of their affordable housing plan.217 While it is
conceivable that a market-driven approach like the Illinois Act is the most
efficient method for fostering appropriate development of affordable hous-
ing, it is apparent that more authoritative methods could be utilized to that
end.2 18
Aside from the statute's inherent weaknesses, municipalities may also
have procedures available to them to frustrate the goals set by the Illinois
Act. For example, local governments might begin using their eminent do-
main powers to take property, ostensibly for public use, to thwart proposed
developments. Massachusetts courts have held that a "good faith" taking
for public use, carried out by the local government, can defeat a devel-
oper's pending application for a comprehensive permit.219 However, the
"good faith" requirement may be more theory than fact, as proving bad
faith on the part of the local government would likely prove quite
difficult. 220
Another possible impediment to affordable housing development
might come through historical preservation campaigns. 221 Unlike the Mas-
215. See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/25 (West Supp. 2005).
216. Id. § 67/30.
217. See id. § 67/25(b)(iii) (providing that affordable housing plan must include a statement of
"incentives that local governments may provide for the purpose of attracting affordable housing to their
jurisdiction" (emphasis added)). The language of this provision appears permissive only as regards
municipal incentives.
218. See Stonefield, supra note 7, at 344-49 (describing Massachusetts Act as "inadequate" and
suggesting that disputes between proponents and opponents of affordable housing legislation as well as
among the proponents themselves led to adoption of relatively ineffective statutes like the Massachu-
setts Act).
219. Town of Chelmsford v. DiBiase, 345 N.E.2d 373, 374 (Mass. 1976). But see Pheasant Ridge
Assocs. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1156-58 (Mass. 1987) (holding that a taking initiated
in "bad faith" for specific purpose of defeating developer's application was void).
220. See Pheasant Ridge Assocs., 506 N.E.2d at 1156 (noting that proving bad faith is difficult). In
this case, a number of irregularities attended the taking-perhaps the most striking was a statement
made during a presentation by a local official that effectively admitted that the purpose of the taking
was to defeat the developer's proposal. Id. at 1158 n.8.
221. See Dennis Hous. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 N.E.2d 682, 688 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that a local zoning board of appeals could, as part of a comprehensive permit, grant a certificate on
behalf of a historic district committee).
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sachusetts Act, which allows the local board to grant a developer a com-
prehensive permit in place of individual permits from subsidiary bodies, 222
the Illinois Act contains no such provision. Thus, if an Illinois developer
must obtain a certificate of compliance from the state Historical Preserva-
tion Agency or some local equivalent before proceeding with its develop-
ment,223 the Illinois Act provides no "bypass" mechanism. In theory, then,
historical preservation authorities fall beyond the purview of the SHAB and
might be used to block the development of affordable housing. Although
historical preservation laws are undoubtedly important, and should not be
suspect in most cases, it is still more important that local governments do
not misuse such laws to frustrate well-intentioned efforts to provide afford-
able housing. 224
Finally, courts and the SHAB should be wary of the possibility that
some local governments might attempt to aggressively redefine local codes
and environmental regulations in a way that would exclude affordable
housing, in the hope that these efforts would be shielded from SHAB over-
sight as "non-appealable local government requirements. '225 Such efforts
should not be rewarded, though discovering and remedying them would
likely be even more difficult than weeding out bad faith uses of eminent
domain. 226
In short, even though state courts are unlikely to strike down the Illi-
nois Act, practical challenges may limit its effectiveness in fostering sig-
nificant affordable housing production.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite these weaknesses, advocates of the Illinois Act should not be
disheartened. The Massachusetts Act, though afflicted with many of the
same shortcomings as the Illinois Act,22 7 is probably best described as a
222. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (West 2004).
223. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3410/8 (West 2001).
224. For an anecdote and reflections concerning the possible misuse of historical preservation laws,
see Benjamin M. Reznik, Preservation Versus Affordable Housing, L.A. LAWYER 60 (Jan. 2001).
225. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/15 (West Supp. 2005).
226. A degree of caution is likely warranted when dealing with matters so important both to the
well-being of the general public and to the autonomy of local governments. For additional information
on the relationship between environmental protection and affordable housing, see generally Rusty
Russell, Equity in Eden: Can Environmental Protection and Affordable Housing Comfortably Cohabit
in Suburbia?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 437 (2003).
227. In fact, the Massachusetts Act still retains some "problems" that have been left out of the
Illinois Act. For example, the Massachusetts Act's requirement of a subsidy within the statutory defini-
tion of "low or moderate income housing" has been criticized. See Kenneth Forton, Expanding the
Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law by Eliminating Its Subsidy Requirement,
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modest success.228 Between 1969 and 1999, 18,000 units of affordable
housing were built using comprehensive permits granted under the Massa-
chusetts Act. 229 The number of communities without subsidized housing
fell from 173 in 1972, which constituted approximately half of the state's
municipalities, to only 55 in 1997.230 Even so, relatively few communities
have reached the statutory goal of ten percent, and the demand for afford-
able housing still exceeds its supply. 231
If its supporters hope for the Illinois Act to have a comparable or su-
perior effect in Illinois, some changes are necessary. Most glaringly, the
Act's lack of express home rule preemption is a loophole that the legisla-
ture should close to ensure that the Act is not wholly ineffectual. Unfortu-
nately, the political support necessary to mend this problem may be lacking
in the state legislature. 232 Likewise, any attempt to enhance the Act's effec-
tiveness by making its provisions more directive or by providing direct
financial assistance to affordable housing developers would likely face stiff
opposition. Even so, adding some provisions that are not entirely reliant
upon market forces-for example, mandating that a set percentage of new
construction be affordable housing in those communities with the fewest
affordable units-could help to spur development that might otherwise
never occur. If the market alone is left to dictate the operation of the Illinois
Act, affordable housing may never make inroads into some communities
because developers may never find such development economically vi-
able.233 The legislature could also make the Act's affordable housing goals
more challenging to local governments, though this, too, would likely face
opposition.234
In addition to possible changes to the language of the statute, adminis-
trators should clarify its many ambiguities in any forthcoming regulations
to the Illinois Act. This would include specifying which parties have stand-
28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 651,677-80 (2001). Likewise, critics have suggested that "it is difficult to
justify" the statutory restriction upon the types of builders who qualify for the statute's protection.
Stonefield, supra note 7, at 336.
228. See Krefetz, supra note 6, at 392-95 (describing the effect of the Massachusetts Act in stimu-
lating proposals for and construction of affordable housing in Massachusetts).
229. Id. at 392.
230. Id. at 393.
231. Id. at 394.
232. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
233. Whether this constitutes evidence that there is no market for affordable housing in those
communities or instead constitutes a market failure is, of course, open to debate.
234. For example, an amendment to the Illinois Act was proposed in the senate which would have
modified the three percent increase goal to require a three percent increase "every 5 years." This portion
of the amendment was not enacted. S.B. 2724, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess, (Ill. 2004) (as introduced,
Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/93/SB/PDF/09300SB2724.pdf.
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ing before the SHAB and clarifying the notice requirements for the SHAB
proceedings. Such regulations might also add further detail to the criteria
that the SHAB can consider in reaching its decision and to the precise defi-
nition of "non-appealable local government requirements." Regulations
could also help to set parameters on the SHAB's power to reverse the local
authority when doing so would result in affordable housing units in excess
of either the community's local housing goal or the ten percent statutory
threshold.235 Finally, administrative regulations could specify whether, and
to what extent, a developer who obtains a favorable ruling from the SHAB
can modify his or her development plans afterwards without having to re-
visit the approval and appeals process.
The Code of Massachusetts Regulations includes a regulation that
would be of particular interest to those wary of the Illinois Act.236 This
regulation provides that the local board's denial or conditional grant of a
developer's application is consistent with local needs if that developer had
sought a variance for the same property within the preceding year and if its
initial proposal did not contain affordable housing.237 A similar regulation
in Illinois would serve a dual function. First, where the local board denied
the former application, that denial would prove that animus towards afford-
able housing did not motivate the denial of the subsequent application.
Second, regardless of whether the former application proceeded to denial or
was withdrawn, the regulation would limit the opportunistic developer's
ability to use affordable housing to force through an otherwise objection-
able development. By including limiting regulations like this one, the
IHDA might be able to win over some of the legislators needed to make
further changes to the statute itself, while at the same time enhancing the
overall effectiveness of the Act. With some of these changes, the Illinois
Act might prove to be a valuable tool in creating housing opportunities for
those caught in the affordability gap.
235. In Massachusetts, a court faced with this issue held that a permit could issue where the current
amount of affordable housing was below the statutory threshold while the amount after construction
would be above the statutory threshold. Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 446 N.E.2d
748, 754-55 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983). Such a result is advisable in Illinois as well because reaching a
numerically precise threshold through the Illinois Act process is unlikely. To the extent that a proposed
development would result in affordable housing greatly exceeding the community's chosen goal, it is
likely that the SHAB would question whether the local board's denial was actually unreasonable.
236. 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 31.07(l)(h) (2005), available at
http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/regulations/76003 l.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005).
237. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Statewide override statutes like the Illinois Act represent one approach
to easing the serious affordability gap facing families in the United States.
The Illinois Act pursues a market-driven solution to the affordable housing
shortage by providing developers with relief from municipal ordinances
and policies that inhibit the construction of affordable housing.238 Because
this approach requires some preemption of municipal authority, the Illinois
Act is likely to create controversy as it moves into the enforcement stage,
and that controversy will likely result in legal and practical challenges to
the Act.
As these challenges arise, analysts and litigants can look to the history
of similar statutes in other states to predict the fate of the Illinois Act. The
history of the Massachusetts Act is particularly instructive because that law
has been in effect for over three decades, during which it has been the sub-
ject of judicial and academic scrutiny. By studying the Massachusetts Act,
interested parties can predict the kinds of challenges that litigants may raise
to the Illinois Act as well as the likely resolution of such challenges in Illi-
nois courts.
This side-by-side analysis reveals certain differences between Illinois
and Massachusetts law that will likely hamstring the effectiveness of the
Illinois Act to a greater degree than its Massachusetts counterpart. Most
notably, the Illinois Act's apparent inapplicability to home rule communi-
ties is a substantial legal obstacle to its effectiveness. Furthermore, al-
though Illinois courts are unlikely to invalidate the Illinois Act in its
entirety, numerous practical challenges also stand in the way of its goal of
increasing affordable housing production.
With some changes, the Illinois Act could prove to be an effective tool
for promoting affordable housing construction. In particular, the Illinois
Act must apply to home rule communities if it is to enlarge the affordable
housing stock to any appreciable degree. Illinois lawmakers should look to
the example set by the Massachusetts Act to increase the effectiveness of
the Illinois Act, while at the same time incorporating provisions that will
safeguard the municipal zoning authority from undue interference. If Illi-
nois lawmakers incorporate these changes in the Illinois Act, then the af-
fordability gap in Illinois may slowly begin to narrow for the state's needy
families. Without these changes, however, the Illinois Act may prove to be
little more than an empty promise.
238. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/10 (West Supp. 2005).
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